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Abstract
Background: Health facility regulation in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is generally weak, with potentially 
serious consequences for safety and quality. Innovative regulatory reforms were piloted in three Kenyan counties 
including: a Joint Health Inspection Checklist (JHIC) synthesizing requirements across multiple regulatory agencies; 
increased inspection frequency; allocating facilities to compliance categories which determined warnings, sanctions 
and/or time to re-inspection; and public display of regulatory results. The reforms substantially increased inspection 
scores compared with control facilities. We developed lessons for future regulatory policy from this pilot by identifying 
key factors that facilitated or hindered its implementation.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative study to understand views and experiences of actors involved in the one-year pilot. 
We interviewed 77 purposively selected staff from the national, county and facility levels. Data were analyzed using the 
framework approach, identifying facilitating/hindering factors at the facility, inspection system, and health system levels.
Results: The joint health inspections (JHIs) were generally viewed as fair, objective and transparent, which enhanced 
their perceived legitimacy. Interactions with inspectors were described as friendly and supportive, in contrast to the 
punitive culture of previous inspections when bribery had been common. Inspector training and use of an electronic 
checklist were strongly praised. However, practical challenges with transport, route planning and budgets highlighted the 
critical nature of strong logistical management. The effectiveness of inspection in improving compliance was hampered 
by limitations in related systems, particularly facility licensing, enforcement of closures and, in the public sector, control 
of funds. However, an inclusive reform development process had led to high buy-in across regulatory agencies which 
was key to the system’s success.
Conclusion: Effective facility inspection involves more than “hardware” such as checklists, protocols and training. 
Cultural, relational and institutional “software” are also crucial for legitimacy, feasibility of implementation and 
enforceability, and should be carefully integrated into regulatory reforms. 
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Background
Most low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have 
pluralistic health systems, with coexistence of public and 
private provision and financing of healthcare.1 An analysis of 
World Health Survey data of 39 LMICs found that over 40% 
of outpatient visits were to either a private-for-profit or a faith 
based organization (FBO)/non-governmental organization 
(NGO) facility.2 Recent years have seen increased involvement 
of private facilities in providing health services, reflecting 
inadequate coverage and quality of the public sector, rapid 
urbanization, and increasing disposable incomes.3 These 
private facilities range from small clinics to large multi-
specialty hospitals and hospital chains, with a mix of for-
profit and not-for-profit orientation.4
LMIC governments struggle to regulate these pluralistic and 
highly fragmented health systems effectively.5 Regulation can 
be broadly defined to encompass not only government rules, 
but also community accountability, contracting arrangements, 
and quality improvement or assurance activities.6 Here we 
focus on the narrower definition around “command and 
control” strategies, where the force of law is used to pursue 
policy objectives and guard public safety.7 These statutory 
regulations are outdated in many LMICs,3 and often focus 
on market entry, with limited effective control of operation 
post-entry.8 Governments often have incomplete information 
even on the size of the private sector, with unregistered 
facilities common.6,9 Regulatory systems in LMICs have also 
failed to keep pace with recent thinking in regulatory policy, 
such as “risk-based” and “responsive” regulation.7 Risk-
based regulation involves prioritizing resources to regulatees 
expected to be highest risk, while responsive regulation is 
based on a pyramid of sanctions beginning with dialogue and 
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persuasion, gradually escalating through warnings and repeat 
inspections, to more punitive measures (“soft words before 
hard”).10 Documentation of strategies aimed at strengthening 
regulation in LMICs is poor11 and their evaluation very limited 
except for a few randomised trials in pharmacies.5,12 The use of 
other approaches such as case studies and qualitative methods 
for rigorous investigation of regulatory implementation is 
also rare.13,14
Compared to most other sub-Saharan Africa countries, 
Kenya’s private healthcare sector is relatively developed, yet 
remains poorly regulated.15 Over half (52.6%) of Kenya’s health 
facilities are private, of which 78% are for-profit, 16% FBO 
and 6% NGO.16 Although health service delivery is devolved 
to 47 semi-autonomous counties, regulation remains the 
responsibility of the national government, implemented by 
eight regulatory agencies (for doctors and dentists, clinical 
officers, nurses, public health officers (PHO), pharmacies, 
laboratories, radiologists and nutrition and dieticians), and 
overseen by the Ministry of Health (MoH). 
Kenya’s eight regulatory agencies were mandated to visit 
facilities independently and conduct inspections using 
their own criteria. However, it was estimated that less than 
5% of private facilities received any inspection each year, 
and even where inspections were done, records were poorly 
kept, making follow-up action difficult. In addition, there 
were complaints of conflicting standards across regulators, 
and lack of clarity on sanctions for non-compliance.17 These 
weaknesses were reflected in poor regulatory compliance, 
with 98% of Kenyan facilities failing to meet minimum patient 
safety standards in a nationwide survey.18
The Joint Health Inspections Pilot
It was against this background that the Kenyan MoH proposed 
an innovative joint facility inspection system that combined 
and refined standards from all eight regulatory agencies 
into one tool for inspecting public and private facilities. 
This Joint Health Inspection (JHI) system incorporated 
insights from risk-based and responsive regulation. Facilities 
were categorized into compliance categories based on their 
inspection score (Table 1). The lowest compliance/highest 
risk facilities were to be immediately closed, while for other 
facilities, time to reinspection was positively related to 
compliance category. Following the principles of responsive 
regulation, facilities outside the lowest compliance category 
were not penalized for infringements on their first inspection, 
but informed about their performance, with closure only to 
be implemented if sufficient improvements had not taken 
place at their third inspection. 
The MoH, with the support of the World Bank Group, 
piloted the JHI in 2017 through a randomised controlled trial 
(RCT) in the three counties of Kakamega, Kilifi and Meru, 
termed the Kenya Patient Safety Impact Evaluation (KePSIE). 
Market centres in each county were randomly assigned to one 
of three arms, with roughly 400 facilities per arm. In arms 1 
and 2, all public and private facilities were inspected at least 
once annually following the JHI protocol. In addition, in arm 
2, inspection performance scorecards were publicly displayed 
at the facility. Arm 3 continued with normal practice, which 
effectively meant no facilities were inspected.
The trial was the largest to date on facility regulation in an 
LMIC setting. A wide range of stakeholders were involved 
in implementation. Advisory and governance support was 
provided by a World Bank core team and the KePSIE Task Force 
comprising national and county health officials, managers 
of the regulatory bodies and private sector representatives. 
A MoH coordinator was responsible for managing and 
supervising implementation, with inspections carried out by 
8 nationally-seconded inspectors across the three counties. 
Inspectors were supported by two World Bank field staff 
in each county, who also oversaw the KePSIE evaluation. 
Closures of facilities or facility departments identified to lack 
valid licenses during inspections were implemented during a 
subsequent visit by MoH staff. A focal person was identified 
within each County Health Management Team to support the 
process.
The KePSIE team outlined the activities, outputs and 
hypothesized causal pathways in a Theory of Change 
(Figure 1) for the JHI pilot. The intervention had three 
Implications for policy makers
• Effective facility inspection involves much more than the “hardware” elements, such as checklists, protocols and training. 
• Relational and cultural “software” are also crucial for legitimacy, feasibility and enforceability, and should be carefully integrated into regulatory 
reforms.
• During the inspection reforms piloted in Kenya key software elements included (i) enhancing perceptions of objectivity, fairness and 
transparency; (ii) an inspection culture supportive to facility staff; (iii) strong logistical planning and management; and (iv) high level buy-in 
across regulatory stakeholders.
• The impact of inspections is also heavily influenced by the related systems for enforcement, licensing and financing, all of which need to work 
well if compliance is to substantially improve.  
Implications for the public
In a context of a large and growing private facility sector and a weak regulatory system, patient safety can easily be compromised. In Kenya a pilot of 
an innovative set of regulatory reforms has improved facility compliance. We identified key factors that facilitated or hindered the pilot’s success. We 
found that it is not enough to have the right “hardware” in terms of checklists, protocols and training. Successful inspection also required “software” 
elements such as perceived fairness and legitimacy, a supportive culture, strong planning and management, and high-level buy-in. These lessons are 
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broad components: (i) a regulatory framework with clear 
guidelines on minimum patient safety standards and 
sanctions; (ii) a system for tracking compliance through 
inspection and enforcing warnings and sanctions, with an 
accompanying online monitoring system; and (iii) (in arm 2 
only) performance scorecards indicating compliance category 
posted on facility walls with leaflets explaining these provided 
for patients. These components were expected to improve the 
knowledge of health facility staff and patients, and increase 
staff incentives for compliance, ultimately improving patient 
safety and health outcomes. Inspections were conducted 
using an electronic Joint Health Inspection Checklist (JHIC) 
on a tablet, which automatically generated a facility score. 
Inspectors gave the facility a brief summary report indicating 
the scores, with a full physical report provided at a later date. 
During the one-year pilot, 2138 inspection visits were made 
to intervention health facilities, out of which 1670 resulted in 
successful inspections. A total of 385 closure visits were made 
resulting in 176 facilities being closed physically, together 
with many departments within other facilities.
The RCT’s focus was on the impact of the intervention 
on JHI scores. Preliminary results showed that inspection 
scores for facilities in the intervention arms were 15% higher 
compared to normal practice (41% vs. 35% compliance), with 
larger improvements in private facilities (19% increase vs. 7% 
in public).19 There was no difference between intervention 
facilities with and without scorecards. 
There is increased recognition that understanding the 
change processes behind such results, and how interventions 
actually work (or fail to work) is extremely important.20-23 In 
doing this, it is essential to listen to the voices of the actors 
directly involved, to understand their views, perceptions 
and experiences. In this paper we present the findings of a 
qualitative evaluation of JHI pilot implementation, conducted 
independently from the KePSIE RCT. We draw on interviews 
with those involved in the pilot, including staff from the MoH 
and World Bank, regulatory agencies, county governments 
and facilities. We focus here on the inspections and closures 
(public display of scorecards and community perceptions will 
be covered in a separate paper). The objective is to assess how 
the JHI pilot was implemented in practice, identifying key 
facilitating or hindering factors, in order to draw lessons for 
regulatory policy and practice. 
Table 1.  JHIC Scores and Follow-up Actions
JHIC Score Compliance Category Follow-up Action
≤10% or no license Non-compliant Immediate closure
11%-40% Minimally compliant Re-inspection in 3 monthsFacility will be closed if it does not score over 40% in the third inspection
41%-60% Partially compliant Re-inspection in 6 monthsFacility will be closed if it does not score over 60% score in the third inspection
61%-75% Substantially compliant Re-inspection in 12 months
>75% Fully compliant Re-inspection in 24 months
Abbreviation: JHIC, Joint Health Inspection Checklist.
Source:17
Figure 1. Theory of Change for Joint Health Inspection Pilot. Abbreviation: PS, patient safety. Source: KePSIE Evaluation Team.
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Methods
Study Setting
The three pilot counties were selected because they contained 
a wide diversity of market sizes and to ensure a representative 
mix of regions.17 Key county characteristics are summarized 
in Table 2. Data collection for this qualitative study was 
conducted in these three counties and in the capital city, 
Nairobi.
Study Design and Data Collection
The study employed a qualitative design. We began with a 
workshop to review the JHI Theory of Change (Figure 1) in 
February 2018, attended by MoH officials, World Bank staff, 
regulatory agency staff, county officials and inspectors. They 
highlighted other key factors influencing implementation, 
and informed the development of in-depth interview topic 
guides. The guide covered respondents’ views and experiences 
of each aspect of the inspection reforms and their perceptions 
of impact, with tools adapted slightly for each interviewee 
type to reflect the nature of their involvement (tools are 
provided in Supplementary files 1-4). Interviewees were 
contacted by phone to schedule appointments. We conducted 
77 in-depth interviews with purposively selected stakeholders 
at the national, county and facility levels who were directly 
involved in the implementation of the inspection reforms. At 
the national level, we interviewed MoH officials, regulatory 
managers from the regulatory agencies and a representative 
of the private sector umbrella body; at the county level, 
county officials, inspectors, and World Bank field staff; and 
at the facility level, staff or managers present at the time the 
inspections were conducted (Table 3). Of the 77 interviewees, 
33 were female (25/51 facility staff, 2/6 county managers, 0/5 
inspectors, 3/5 World Bank field staff, 3/10 national level 
interviewees).
Facility interviewees were selected to achieve a mix of facility 
ownership type (23 public, 20 private for-profit, 8 FBO), 
facility level (32 dispensary, 12 health centre, 7 hospital), and 
inspection scores. 
Following a 4-day training workshop, and piloting in one 
of the trial counties, two authors with considerable qualitative 
research experience (ET and IK) conducted the interviews 
between May 2018 and April 2019 until data saturation was 
achieved. All interviews were conducted in English and took 
an average of 45 minutes to one hour. Interviews were audio-
recorded where possible, and notes taken. No interviewees 
refused to participate, but we were unable to secure an 
appointment with one national actor and 10 health facilities; 
the latter were replaced with similar facilities in terms of 
ownership, level and inspection scores.
Data Management and Analysis
Interview data were transcribed in English and exported 
into NVivo 12 for content management. Analysis was done 
using the framework approach.27 The process began with the 
research team reading the transcripts and interview notes 
to familiarize themselves with the data. An initial thematic 
framework was developed in a team workshop, drawing on 
the study objectives and the insights from our workshop on 
Table 2. Characteristics of Study Counties
Kakamega Kilifi Meru National 
Region Western Coast (South) Central/Eastern Not applicable
Size (square km) 3020 12 540 7006 580 876
Population 1 867 579 1 453 787 1 545 714 47 564 296
Population density (per square km) 618 116 221 82
Poverty levels (% below national poverty line) 49.2% 58.4% 31.0% 45.2%
Number of health facilities 316 285 513 >9000
Source: County size and population data,24 Poverty levels,25 Number of health facilities.26
Table 3. Characteristics of Interviewees
Interviewees Kakamega Kilifi Meru National Total
County level
  Health facility staff 17 17 17 - 51
  County MoH managers 2 1 3 - 6
  Inspectors 1 2 2 - 5
  World Bank field staff 1 2 2 - 5
National level
  MoH officials - - - 2 2
  Regulators - - - 6 6
  World Bank staff - - - 1 1
  Private sector representative - - - 1 1
Total 21 22 24 10 77
Abbreviation: MoH, Ministry of health.
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the JHI theory of change, and from themes emerging from the 
data. Co-coding of selected transcripts by CG, ET, IK and FW 
was used to refine the coding framework, with all transcripts 
then coded by either EK, IK or DO (coding tree provided in 
Supplementary file 5). Codes were organized into thematic 
groups to identify key facilitating and hindering factors for 
effective inspection. Preliminary findings were discussed 
with national and county level participants during a national 
workshop held in September 2019.
Results 
We present findings on factors facilitating or hindering the 
implementation of the JHI pilot at the: (i) Micro level – 
concerning the facility-level experience of inspections; (ii) 
Meso level – concerning the operation of the inspection 
system; and (iii) Macro level – concerning links with the 
broader health system. 
Micro-level
Three key themes were identified at the micro level, related 
to the perceived fairness and objectivity of inspections, the 
inspection culture, and the potential for bribery. 
Fairness and Objectivity
An important facilitating factor was that nearly all respondents 
felt the JHIs were generally fair. National actors observed that 
fairness and objectivity were emphasized in the design and 
implementation of the JHIs, and in training of inspectors. 
Facility staff appreciated receiving a copy of the JHIC prior to 
inspections, and a summary report at the end outlining areas 
for improvement, which were perceived to have enhanced 
transparency, improved awareness of standards, and increased 
confidence in the process. 
“The checklist is now more objective, yeah, it doesn’t 
depend on the operator who is the inspector, yeah, so there is 
no room for subjectivity there, it’s an objective checklist and 
it’s a matter of you tick, if it’s a yes or no answer, do you have 
it or you don’t have it…” (National actor 4/1).
“But these ones have a checklist and I have a copy…even if 
I don’t read it today, I can go back to the checklist, look at it 
and see what I can do” (Private dispensary staff 1/4).
Respondents across all categories liked that the checklist 
was electronic and could compute scores automatically, which 
they felt standardized inspections and reduced bias. Facility 
staff were generally happy that inspections were carried out in 
their presence. This made the scores more acceptable. 
“...yeah it’s like they had trust in the electronic bit of it, 
yeah you could see also the excitement when you are giving 
them to sign eeeh! Then at the end then the results they 
were like ‘Aaah aah, the results are there, so I got 75% so I 
got a 60%’ so you can see maybe they appreciate that one” 
(Inspector 3/2). 
“The scoring was like a team work. Even the people 
[facility staff] were involved. If you don’t have this, you 
know… that’s why the score is low. So, there was, there were 
very few incidences where they feel like they were unfairly 
treated” (County manager 1/2).
Facility staff and county managers reported no interference 
with inspections by County Health Management Teams. A 
JHI appeals process was set up, which some inspectors and 
World Bank field staff felt was another way of promoting 
fairness, allowing for re-inspection by a different inspector. 
However, in practice no appeals were made about disputed 
scores, although several facilities called the MoH coordinator 
to contest closures. 
Facility staff had varied opinions on the inspection scores 
they received. Some felt they were fair and reflective of their 
performance, while others felt they were harsh, particularly 
the first inspection. Many staff felt the checklist punished 
smaller facilities, and proposed additional customization. 
This partly reflected limited understanding of the skip process 
in the checklist whereby smaller facilities were not penalized 
for lacking certain services such as a labour ward, but facility 
staff did not always realize this. However, the concerns were 
also directed at items required for all facilities which they 
deemed irrelevant, for instance, expecting a small facility with 
few staff to have an organogram. 
“Maybe what they can do if you can design a checklist 
specifically for a dispensary, a checklist specifically for a 
hospital so that it is very particular” (Public dispensary 
staff 2/16).
Some small private for-profit facilities said they did not 
have the capacity to meet some JHIC standards, asking that 
longer grace periods be allowed to enable them to raise funds. 
“The private facilities they would cry much and say that 
whatever the checklist is asking for from my small facility, 
they are asking me for a vacuum extractor, they are asking 
me for things like what, some equipment, it is so expensive 
for me because I am the person who is supposed to foot that 
bill” (World Bank field staff 1/2).
Another concern raised by various actors was that poor 
scores were an unfair reflection of performance of staff 
working in public and some faith-based facilities, who had 
little control over finances and therefore lacked capacity to 
implement major changes (see macro level factors below). 
Finally, one private for-profit facility manager worried that 
having a single inspector conducting inspections (rather than 
an inspection team) could result in bias or favoritism, but this 
point was not raised by other actors. 
Supportive Culture of Inspections
All respondents observed that inspections under the previous 
system were intimidating, harsh and focused on fault finding. 
Facility staff said these visits, often conducted by multiple 
inspectors from different regulatory agencies, felt like “police 
raids,” at times leading to arrests. They observed that the JHI 
took a more supportive approach, something which other 
actors noted was emphasized during inspector training. 
“So from the onset there was going to be a paradigm 
shift in terms of how the inspectors viewed the inspection, 
then how the service providers would actually be included, 
so that they would look at these as a form of a continuous 
process of improvement rather than an act of enforcement” 
(National Actor 4/2).
“Most of them [facility staff] were welcoming, most of 
them were positive. You can remember that our approach 
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was different from the regular inspections so the approach 
itself gave them an opportunity to welcome us and listen 
to us, so we made quite a few friends in there during the 
inspection” (Inspector 2/1).
Nearly all facility staff confirmed that the change in culture 
was felt on the ground, adding that inspections were now more 
supportive, friendly and designed to improve compliance. 
They appreciated that inspectors took time to explain the 
process and respond to queries. 
“These inspections have been friendly. Second, they teach 
us a lot, they make us conscious. Some things that we have 
forgotten these inspections make us very perfect because 
I know when they come they are going to ask me these 
questions so where I was failing I try to do some corrections 
there. I like them” (Private dispensary staff 2/2).
Facility staff also appreciated being allowed to interrupt 
inspections to attend to patients where necessary. The friendly 
nature of the relationship with inspectors was illustrated 
by facilities calling for re-inspections after implementing 
improvements. However, there were a few exceptions, where 
facility staff complained of joint health inspectors being harsh 
and combative.
Reduced Potential for Bribery
All respondents acknowledged that inspector bribery was a 
common feature of the previous inspection system. This was 
attributed to the intimidating nature of inspections and the 
absence of mechanisms for holding inspectors accountable. 
In contrast, most respondents said they had not experienced 
cases of bribery with the JHIs, which they attributed to 
their friendly, standardized and transparent nature. Other 
measures linked to reduced bribery included random quality 
checks by World Bank field staff to verify inspection scores, 
the rule that prevented an inspector from conducting two 
consecutive inspections at a facility, the visibility of scores 
data on the electronic monitoring system, and the emphasis 
on reputation for integrity during inspector recruitment. 
“The inspections which have been done in the past, most of 
them were based on money and you will not get advice from 
them. Once they come they’ll maybe want the inspection fee 
and whatever. You get the receipt for the inspection fee and 
after they ask for bribes so you give them so they can leave 
and you continue with your work. So what I can say these 
last two [JHI] inspections have been perfect because they 
came purposefully to advice people” (Private hospital staff 
1/7).
However, there were some reports of inspectors trying to 
solicit bribes and some inspectors reported being offered 
bribes to change inspection scores or leave a non-compliant 
facility open. One facility said they suspected their pharmacy 
was closed because they did not bribe.
Meso-level 
Two major hindering/facilitating themes were identified 
at the meso-level – the management and logistics of the 
inspection system, and the process for closing departments 
or whole facilities.
Operational Management and Logistics
At the inspection system level, several operational factors 
were linked to successful implementation of the inspections. 
First, inspector training was said to have been rigorous 
and thorough, involving intensive classroom exercises and 
practical experience.
“Okay, the training was intensive, and it was good and 
well-articulated, and it was detailed. So that when we left 
there, we were able to carry out the inspections without any 
hiccup or anything” (Inspector 3/1).
Secondly, inspectors noted that the electronic format of 
the JHI made inspection processes easier, allowed instant 
generation and issuance of summary reports to the facilities, 
and enabled inspectors to easily upload inspection reports to 
a central server. 
“Okay let me tell you in general I think that’s the best thing 
ever, I think that’s the best way to go is using the electronic 
bit of it because one it made my work very easy. I just go 
there, I key in my findings then at the end I get my results” 
(Inspector 3/2).
World Bank field staff noted that their post-inspection 
checks helped strengthen implementation. These included 
random spot checks to confirm that facilities in arm 2 were 
still displaying inspection scorecards, and that closed facilities 
had not reopened, and quality checks to countercheck JHIC 
scores in random facilities. 
However, some logistical challenges were noted. For all 
counties, inspection delays resulted from bad weather and 
terrain, vehicle breakdowns, and delays in releasing funds 
for fuel and other operations. While two counties had MoH 
vehicles, the third was provided with a county vehicle, which 
was frequently recalled for other county functions. 
Secondly, some inspectors felt they should have been 
more involved in making daily inspection visit plans. Route 
planning was done by World Bank field staff, with urban 
facilities inspected first, as they were located closer to each 
other facilitating monitoring in the early stages. Some 
inspectors felt inspections should have started in more remote 
facilities during the initial dry months of the year (January 
and February), with more accessible urban facilities inspected 
during the rainy season. In addition, inspectors mainly shared 
one vehicle in each county, meaning they had to be dropped 
and picked at different facilities each day along a planned 
route. This proved challenging as sometimes inspectors had 
to wait for long periods to be collected after finishing their 
inspection, which was felt to be inefficient and sometimes 
posed a security threat for inspectors who had recommended 
facility closure. 
“You know there were instances where … if I’m the first 
person I reach my facility the next person will reach his facility 
after one hour, you get that? That is before the third person 
is dropped, so … even before the third person is dropped, I 
am through with the inspection and then I start waiting, I 
wait for three to four hours and that was very frustrating” 
(Inspector 2/1). 
Closure and Grace Periods
According to the JHI protocol, facilities without a valid license 
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were to be closed immediately. The process entailed inspectors 
passing a closure notice to the county government, which 
would then authorize their PHOs to execute the closure within 
two weeks and display a closure notice at the facility. A similar 
process was to be followed if specific departments, such as lab 
or pharmacy, lacked their own license. However, the closure 
process faced challenges. Early testing of the JHIC revealed 
that a large proportion of facilities lacked valid licenses and 
would have had to be closed, likely affecting overall service 
provision. For this reason, the KePSIE Task Force introduced 
90-day grace periods for facilities with expired licenses, as 
long as they had qualified staff and expressed an intention 
to renew. In addition, closures were affected by nationwide 
strikes by public sector doctors (December 2016 to March 
2017) and nurses (June to November 2017), which paralyzed 
public services. The fear was that closing private facilities 
would have negatively impacted access.
“…when we wanted to close and in the dynamics in the 
ministry we had nurses strike then we had the healthcare 
workers strike and then we closed a facility that was faith-
based. They started calling that we don’t have anywhere to 
go and here you are closing so once in a while we would 
get negative publicity…negative reaction from the counties” 
(National actor 4/3).
Even following grace periods, interviewees observed that 
county PHOs did not carry out closures as envisioned. As a 
result, the JHI protocol was changed and the role transferred 
to the MoH coordinator, who would travel from Nairobi 
periodically to close facilities. 
“So, for example the protocol was that initially when a 
facility was reported for closure by an inspector someone 
from the county must go and close it within the next 24 
hours, you know 24 or 48 hours. Well the county didn’t 
do that, that was not even remotely feasible at all.....we 
realized that the only way that they were going to happen is 
if someone from the ministry, from the national government 
went…” (National actor 4/4).
The shift of this role to the MoH coordinator caused 
delays of up to six months in effecting closures, with some 
inspectors complaining that this reduced their legitimacy and 
morale. Several reasons were given for the failure of county 
staff to implement closures. In one county in particular, there 
were five changes in senior county health management staff 
during the year, requiring repeated orientation about JHI. 
Secondly, public officials felt it was inappropriate to close 
public facilities, even where their performance was extremely 
poor. However, they also failed to implement private facility 
closures. Some PHOs were said to be reluctant to take up this 
new role which they felt was not part of their job description, 
also complaining of lack of funds for transport. 
“…it took a very long time for this [PHO] to follow up, 
because every time we would go back it was like reminding 
him we had given you this and this and this, did you follow up 
or anything and he was like most of the time – ‘am not paid 
to do this work, I’m taking time out of my normal duties,’ so 
I don’t know whose duty it is because he is the public health 
officer for the county or the sub-county” (World Bank Field 
Staff 3/2).
Some respondents felt these complaints reflected deeper 
concerns and conflicts of interest on the part of county staff, 
who were part of the same community as the facilities they 
were required to close. This could lead to concerns for their 
safety following closures; and reluctance to close facilities 
owned by county officials. 
“…we had challenges because some of the officers from the 
county they say this is a facility in my village if I accompany 
you to close it, you guys will go back to Nairobi, you will 
leave me here in the village, this person will come for me 
in the village, so there was that challenge in terms of the 
relationships the county officers had with those facilities. 
Some of the county officers own those facilities, so there was 
a bit of conflict of interest in terms of that and that’s why our 
recommendation was the national regulatory body…be the 
one to go and enforce the closure” (National actor 4/1).
Some interviewees reported concerns over the credibility 
of PHOs, who had a reputation for collecting bribes from 
facilities operating unlawfully. 
“And also in some instances you would tell the PHO that 
this facility needs to be actually closed and maybe he had 
some relationship with that facility because when we went to 
the facility the providers told us that the PHO takes money 
from them on a monthly basis” (World Bank Field Staff 3/2).
Broader political influence and interference were also 
reported to have affected enforcement of closures. One 
facility staff reported that closing a public facility in an area 
perceived to be an opposition stronghold could be interpreted 
as an attempt to portray local leaders in bad light. 
“People may interpret it like if you’re in opposition zone 
people in the national government is trying to suppress us 
especially now a politician goes and repeat that in a podium 
it will be counterproductive to the national government” 
(Public hospital staff 2/15)
There were also a few cases where facilities recommended 
for closure continued operating because the owner had 
political influence.
“And there were others who really, they didn’t care because 
there was another facility somewhere in [large town] had a 
closure scorecard on the door but it used to operate normally, 
yes they didn’t care about the closure I think he knew some 
big people in the county offices so he wasn’t afraid of the 
scorecard” (Inspector 3/1).
Macro-level 
The operation of the inspection system was interconnected 
with the broader health system in ways that both facilitated 
and hampered implementation, with links to licensing, facility 
resources and the buy-in of the regulatory agencies.
Links to the Licensing System
The JHIC required that facilities have a general license, 
department licenses (eg, laboratory), and licenses for 
professional staff. Facility and department licenses were 
renewed annually and professional licenses every two to three 
years. Licensing and inspection processes were independent 
of each other, with the former carried out by the respective 
regulatory agencies. 
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The majority of facility staff raised concerns over the process 
and cost of licensing, and the consequences for inspection. 
Satisfaction with licensing processes varied substantially 
across regulators, with some being more efficient than others. 
For instance, while some regulators had online renewal 
processes, others required staff to travel to Nairobi to renew 
licenses. 
“It’s cumbersome, really cumbersome because you see 
you have got to go all the way to Nairobi…for the license 
which it can be done maybe online or maybe decentralized 
or devolved down to the county level” (Private dispensary 
staff 3/14).
There were complaints that some regulators delayed issuing 
licenses after payment, sometimes for over a year. There were 
also complaints over multiplicity of licenses, with arguments 
that these should be streamlined into a single license. 
“But then now, there are several other multiple players 
each one wanting a cost and the cost of opening a facility, 
because now for you to have an x-ray you have to need some 
license from Radiation Protection Board, and the laboratory 
will require licensing from Kenya Medical Laboratory and 
Technologists Board, the nurses will of course get licensing 
from the Nursing Council, clinical officers from Clinical 
Officers Council. So, it brings, this facility now gets overtaxed 
and I think to me, it is multiple taxation” (Public hospital 
staff 2/15).
To complicate matters further, public facilities were 
registered directly by the MoH, independently of regulatory 
bodies and county authorities, and the system for licensing 
departments in public facilities was yet to be finalized.
Access to Resources for Public Facilities
Public facility staff expressed great frustration at receiving 
low JHI scores, which they felt reflected badly on their 
performance, while they had little control over resources 
and could not undertake important improvements, such as 
increasing staff, and purchasing equipment. 
“Me as the in-charge for example, I rely on the goodwill of 
the County and despite of how much we advocate, I can only 
move as far as they can support me and if they don’t support 
me then I might remain grounded however much my good 
intentions might be. I might say I want this, and if they don’t 
finance me to do that, if they do not give me more health 
workers for example in a certain department, then there is 
nothing much I can do” (Public hospital staff 2/15). 
It was evident from several interviewees that this really 
demotivated some public facility staff. 
Buy-in From Regulatory Bodies
A final macro-level factor key to the success of the inspections 
was the buy-in from regulatory bodies. Prior to JHIs, 
the regulators had been operating in silos, carrying out 
fragmented inspections. Although some agencies had been 
cautious or even hostile to a joint approach when it was first 
proposed, they now felt the JHIs had enhanced cohesion and 
harmonized inspections. 
“For me I always looked at, number one, the joint 
health inspection checklist helped reduce clutter in terms 
of harmonizing all boards to be able to design a tool that 
hits all areas, I felt it made the process more efficient. I feel 
a lot of hospitals are cheated when one inspector comes, the 
other one, inspector comes, the other one inspector … it’s time 
consuming and so on” (National actor 4/5).
The buy-in was linked to the inclusive JHIC development 
process which involved all agencies, and the reassurance that 
their autonomy as individual agencies had not been removed.
“Well, I would not really say that it has affected autonomy, 
it has only impacted on inclusion because the Acts were not 
amended and therefore it means that the powers that are 
still within those Acts are still there and it did not stop for 
example a member of a regulatory board or council again 
walking into that particular county if they deemed fit” 
(National actor 4/2).
Most regulatory bodies also appreciated increased license 
applications and renewals as a result of the inspections, which 
increased revenue for their agencies.
Discussion 
The JHI pilot was praised by Kenyan stakeholders for 
streamlining fragmented inspections and harmonizing 
the activities of the regulatory agencies. The pilot was of 
insufficient duration to assess the full impact of the risk-based 
and responsive regulatory elements of the JHI, as less than 
two thirds of facilities received a second routine inspection 
visit during the one year of implementation. However, the 
KePSIE RCT demonstrated a significant increase in JHIC 
compliance during this period, despite a challenging context 
including sustained health worker strikes and two general 
elections. JHIs are now being adapted for national scale up 
in Kenya, while the innovations have generated interest from 
other African countries, with several making study visits to 
Kenya to learn more. 
We set out to study lessons for future policy and practice from 
this pilot by identifying key factors that facilitated or hindered 
its implementation. Before discussing our findings, we note a 
number of potential limitations of this research. First there 
was a risk of social desirability bias when asking respondents 
about the performance of JHI. Actors may have wanted to 
present themselves in a good light, for example, facilities 
presenting themselves as eager to comply with regulation, or 
inspectors and county actors presenting themselves as having 
fulfilled their roles and operated with integrity. Moreover, 
while our fieldwork team were independent of the inspection 
reforms and the KePSIE RCT, investigators FW and NG 
played substantial roles in JHI implementation. While having 
such “insiders” in our study team was a strength in terms of 
their tacit knowledge and access to interviewees, it is possible 
that this led some interviewees to feel that favorable responses 
on JHI would be well-received. We aimed to address this by 
stressing that no information linkable to individuals would 
be presented, by offering the option of not being audio-
recorded, and by reflecting on our positionality as a team, and 
note that many interviewees did offer critical perspectives. 
Secondly, the JHI pilot was undertaken in 3 counties only, 
and as part of an RCT. The approach might work differently if 
implemented in different counties, or on a larger scale where 
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close oversight was not possible. In particular we believe the 
intensity of health facility inspection to be unprecedented 
in this type of health system, and its replicability without 
external support is unclear. On the other hand, larger scale, 
long-term implementation could improve effectiveness as 
the regulatory reforms become institutionalized and better 
understood. Finally, we have focused here on factors affecting 
the implementation of the inspections and have not explored 
the implications for patient safety and quality of care. There is 
often poor correlation between the structural quality measures 
included in inspection checklists and clinical quality of care 28, 
indicating that an effective inspection system alone may be 
insufficient to improve patient outcomes. 
A starting point for our analysis was the JHI Theory of 
Change (Figure 1) which set out the technical elements of 
the JHI. Together with the financial, human and physical 
resources required, these technical elements could be termed 
the “hardware” of the reforms, including the regulatory 
framework and guidelines, protocol for warnings and 
sanctions, inspector training, monitoring system, and 
scorecards.29 What is striking from our findings is that an 
effective inspection system involves much more than these 
“hardware” elements; it depends on a wide range of relational 
and cultural factors – the “software” of the system30,31 – which 
have a crucial impact on the system’s perceived legitimacy, 
feasibility of implementation and enforceability. To allow 
others to replicate or learn from the JHI experience it is 
important to make these “software” elements explicit, and 
explore their roles.
Starting at the micro level, the JHI Theory of Change 
emphasized the mechanism of improving the knowledge 
of health facility staff in order to improve their compliance. 
Our findings indicate that facility staff ’s perceptions of 
the objectivity, fairness and transparency of the inspection 
system are central in influencing its legitimacy, and therefore 
another key mediating factor. Interviewees reported receiving 
the JHIC prior to inspection, conducting inspections in the 
presence of facility staff, and use of an electronic checklist 
as factors enhancing perceived legitimacy and thus support 
of the new system. These issues have been highlighted more 
generally in the regulatory literature from LMIC and high-
income countries, with greater legitimacy of regulatory 
systems argued to lead to higher levels of compliance without 
very heavy investment in policing performance.32-34 For 
example, a systemic review of inspections, primarily in high 
income settings, underscored the importance of predictable 
and transparent inspection processes that are perceived 
as valid and reliable in encouraging change in response to 
inspection findings.33 
These design features were also potentially important in 
restricting the potential for bribery, together with random 
quality checks by World Bank field staff, and requiring 
different inspectors to conduct consecutive inspections. 
According to study respondents, bribery was rampant in 
the pre-JHI inspection system, echoing findings from other 
LMIC contexts.14,35 This had largely been curbed under the 
JHI, with the exception of a few possible cases. However, the 
generalizability of these results beyond the pilot should be 
carefully considered. World Bank field staff provided close 
oversight in the three counties, through both their support to 
JHI implementation and the RCT, which involved additional 
interaction with facilities for survey data collection. Given 
how commonly corruption is reported within Kenya’s public 
sector,36 it is likely that the inspection system’s ability to control 
bribery would be severely tested in a context of national scale 
up, without similar external oversight.
Another key software element identified for JHI acceptance 
was the culture of inspections and the relationships that 
inspectors formed with facility staff. JHIs were viewed by 
facility staff as helping them improve as opposed to punishing 
them for non-compliance, and were said to be supportive 
and friendly. This approach was deliberately fostered by 
the JHI team and emphasized during inspector training. 
This resonates with recent work highlighting the “social 
dimension” of regulation and importance of relationships 
between regulator and healthcare staff in fostering change, 
while recognizing that there is a difficult line to tread between 
developing good relationships and maintaining sufficient 
critical distance.33,34 Emphasis on culture and relationships fits 
with a responsive regulation approach, and the compliance 
rather than deterrence approach to enforcement, where 
regulators begin by drawing on education, advice, persuasion 
and negotiation,7 contrasting strongly with the punitive 
approach typical in many LMICs.35 Some facility staff still 
found the first inspection “harsh,” emphasizing the potential 
role for a purely advisory first visit. 
The results also highlighted the critical nature of practical 
considerations in effective implementation of an inspection 
system. Implementing regular inspections and enforcing 
closures in numerous widely dispersed facilities is a substantial 
logistical challenge. It is essential to consider carefully the 
need for systematic planning, efficient route scheduling, 
transport availability, human resource management, and 
quality assurance, all of which need to be resourced through 
a realistic budget, with contingency for unexpected costs 
such as vehicle breakdown. Even during the relatively well-
resourced JHI pilot, vehicle breakdowns, unfavourable 
weather, poor roads and inefficient scheduling were said to 
have substantially slowed down inspections. 
Our findings show how dependent the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of an inspection system is on other institutions 
within the broader health system. Regulation is effectively 
a shared function between the national MoH, the county 
health teams, and regulatory bodies, which all had important 
supportive and enforcement roles to play. However, gaps were 
reported in some aspects of these roles, including enforcing 
closures, licensing facilities and departments, and financing 
public facilities. Starting with closures, even if emphasis 
is placed on support and encouragement of facilities, at 
some point sanctions are required to increase incentives for 
compliance and protect patients from the poorest quality care. 
The closure of non-compliant facilities was a key component 
of the JHIs but initial plans for County Governments to 
undertake this were not executed, and KePSIE data indicated 
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that a high proportion of closed facilities reopened without 
permission.19 While this may partially have reflected lack 
of resources and concerns for public access to services, it 
appears that it also reflected personal and political conflicts of 
interest for county officials, reflecting a tension between local 
ownership and independence in regulatory implementation. 
As a result, the closure role was transferred to the MoH 
Coordinator, who personally visited each facility requiring 
closure. This caused substantial delays, and it is unclear how 
effectively this could be replicated at a national scale. 
Possession of an up-to-date license for facilities and 
departments was a fundamental point of JHI compliance, 
but the licensing systems were managed separately by the 
individual regulatory agencies. The inspection reforms clearly 
stimulated greater demand for license renewal, and therefore 
licensing revenues. However, for some (though not all) 
regulators the bureaucracy and inefficiency associated with 
licensing processes led to substantial delays in renewal, which 
were seen as unfair by facilities where they led to warnings and 
sanctions. This emphasizes the importance of streamlining 
licensing procedures, by use of online application processes 
and/or delegation to regional offices. There were also calls 
for a single license to be introduced for health facilities, 
incorporating all departments. This may face resistance from 
some regulators if they feel their autonomy or revenues are 
threatened. However, Kenya is considering moving in that 
direction under the guidance of the recently established 
Kenya Health Professionals Oversight Authority. 
This study raises important questions about the regulation 
of public sector facilities. Previous inspection systems have 
focused on the private sector. The inclusion of public facilities 
in the JHI was seen as important in increasing fairness by 
ensuring that private facilities did not feel unreasonably 
targeted. However, in many cases the capacity of public 
facilities to improve compliance was limited by their lack of 
control over resources. Health centers and dispensaries in 
particular had no facility-level budgets, nor could they retain 
user fees for their own use. They reported feeling demoralized 
by poor scores in repeated inspections when they had been 
unable to make changes. It could be argued that the County 
Governments themselves would have been more appropriate 
recipients of the inspection reports, and/or that lower level 
public facilities should be provided with devolved budgets. 
Inspection of public facilities also raised concerns about 
conflict of interest, and how effectively the government could 
be expected to regulate itself.
In sum, there is a great deal that can be learnt from the JHI 
experience in Kenya, of relevance not only to health facility 
inspection, but also to healthcare regulation more broadly 
(see summary in Figure 2). The JHI contained substantial 
“hardware” innovations, in terms of the harmonization of 
standards across regulatory agencies, the risk-based and 
responsive design of the inspection protocol, the electronic 
checklist, the online monitoring system, and various design 
elements to minimize corruption. We have highlighted here 
the additional “software” elements which were both key to 
its success and could hinder its performance, particularly 
perceptions of fairness and legitimacy, a supportive 
inspection culture, strong planning and management, and 
high-level buy-in. Finally, it is essential that inspection 
systems are not considered in isolation, as their effectiveness 
is heavily influenced by the related systems for enforcement, 
licensing and financing. We recommend that those looking to 
reform or improve enforcement of health facility regulation 
carefully consider these cultural, relational and institutional 
dimensions. 
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•Perceptions of objectivity, fairness and transparency are 
central for legitimacy




•Design the system to minimise opportunities for corruption
•Give considerable weight to logistical planning and 
management
Meso level:
Operation of inspection 
system
•Carefully consider how related systems impact effectiveness, 
particularly enforcement, licensing and financing systems
•Regulation is a shared function requiring consensus and 
ownership across all stakeholders involved
Macro level:
Links with the broader 
health system
Figure 2. Facilitators of Effective Health Facility Inspection.
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